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MORE THAN A FEELIN’: USING SMALL GROUP 
RESEARCH TO INFORM SETTLEMENT 
DECISIONS IN CIVIL LAWSUITS 
Alexis Knutson, Natalie Gordon, and Edie Greene* 
INTRODUCTION 
We should have seen it coming. Years before the string of recent 
allegations came to light, Bill Cosby—everyone’s favorite TV dad—
quietly settled a civil lawsuit brought by a Philadelphia woman and 
friend of Cosby’s who claimed that the entertainer drugged and 
sexually assaulted her in his home in early 2004.1 Although the terms 
of the settlement remain confidential, the 2006 lawsuit revealed the 
names of at least a dozen other women who claimed that Cosby 
assaulted them.2 
Undoubtedly, this lawsuit followed the chronology of most civil 
cases: the filing of a complaint, process of discovery, pretrial 
conferencing, and eventual settlement. Indeed, the vast majority of 
civil lawsuits are settled outside of court via mutual agreement 
between the parties3 because engaging in arbitration or going to trial 
can be costly and time-consuming, and can involve enormous 
uncertainty about opponents’ evidence, jurors’ perceptions, and 
judges’ predilections.4 So settling cases is a commonplace practice 
that benefits attorneys and their clients as well as the courts. 
Yet settlement can also be fraught with complexity and uncertainty 
because it requires attorneys to calibrate, that is, assess the strengths 
and weaknesses of their case, evaluate various settlement proposals, 
                                                                                                                 
 *  Address correspondence to Edie Greene, Department of Psychology, 1420 Austin Bluffs 
Parkway, University of Colorado, Colorado Springs, CO  80918.  (719) 255-4147. egreene@uccs.edu. 
 1. Jennifer Hoar, Bill Cosby Settles Lawsuit, CBS NEWS (Nov. 8, 2006, 3:30 PM), 
www.cbsnews.com/news/bill-cosby-settles-lawsuit/. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 
J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 135 (1993) (“. . . civil litigation is resolved by settlement in an estimated 95 
percent of all disputes . . .”). 
 4. Xavier Rodriguez, The Decline of Civil Jury Trials: A Positive Development, Myth, or the End of 
Justice as We Now Know It?, 45 ST. MARY’S L.J. 333, 343, 348 (2014). 
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and forecast the likely trial outcome.5 Attorneys are not particularly 
skilled at these tasks.6 They make predictable reasoning errors—
many of which we describe in this article—that impair their ability to 
gauge when it is in their clients’ interest to resolve the dispute prior 
to trial and for how much.7 Broadly speaking, allegiance to clients, 
immersion in the minutiae of the law, and attorneys’ own risk 
behaviors can blind them to the weaknesses in their case, the 
strengths of their adversaries’ evidence, and the likelihood of 
winning, thus resulting in difficulties settling lawsuits.8 These lapses 
in logic serve as barriers to settlement. 
There are significant costs associated with the unwillingness to 
accept an adversary’s settlement proposal.9 Across several studies 
that compared final settlement offers with jury awards,10 researchers 
have shown that both plaintiffs and defendants err when deciding to 
proceed to litigation, though their errors are not symmetric: plaintiffs 
are more likely than defendants to make poor decisions, but the 
average cost to defendants exceeds the cost to plaintiffs.11 
In the most recent study, Kiser, Asher, and McShane analyzed 
2,054 California cases in which the parties had engaged, 
unsuccessfully, in settlement negotiations and proceeded to 
arbitration or trial between 2002 and 2005.12 Researchers compared 
the ultimate verdicts and awards to the parties’ settlement positions to 
assess whether attorney/client judgments of likely trial outcomes 
were accurate.13 There was a high incidence of decisional errors: 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Edie Greene & Brian H. Bornstein, Cloudy Forecasts, TRIAL, April 2011, at 28, 30 n.3, 31. 
 6. Id. at 31. 
 7. Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability to Predict Case 
Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 133, 135 (2010). 
 8. See id. at 135. 
 9. See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and 
the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 320 (1991). 
 10. See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to 
Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 51 (1996); Randall L. Kiser et al., Let’s Not Make a Deal: An Empirical 
Study of Decision Making in Unsuccessful Settlement Negotiations, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 551 
(2008); Jeffrey Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113 
(1996). 
 11. Kiser et al., supra note 10, at 566–67. 
 12. Id. at 552. 
 13. Id. at 552–53. 
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sixty-one percent of plaintiffs who passed up a settlement offer and 
proceeded to trial were awarded less than they had been offered—
their average loss was $43,100.14 Although defendants were less 
likely to err (only twenty-four percent would have been better off 
settling than litigating), they lost considerably more—an average of 
$1,140,000—by failing to settle.15 
There are probably several explanations for these poor decisions. It 
may be that lawyers are not explaining the odds to their clients with 
sufficient detail or urgency. It may be that clients are unwilling or 
unable to consider the odds in a rational way. Structural incentives to 
collect fees and accrue billable hours may play a role. But we focus 
on a more fundamental behavioral aspect of this decision calculus: 
we argue that attorneys, given their partisan positions, lack the ability 
to accurately forecast the probabilities of future outcomes. Lacking 
clarity on likely resolutions and the realistic odds of success, they 
may be providing sub-optimal advice to their clients, effectively 
misguiding them toward the courthouse when settlements would be 
the better option. 
Can these problems be remedied and attorneys’ forecasting skills 
improved? The answer is yes. By procuring feedback from 
colleagues, considering verdicts in similar cases and most 
importantly, seeking research-based input from unbiased sources 
prior to trial, attorneys can begin to combat their forecasting 
foibles.16 In particular, by engaging in small group research, 
including mock trials, focus groups, and shadow juries, attorneys can 
get valuable insights about their interpretations of the evidence and 
feedback on the narratives they have constructed and the legal 
arguments they intend to make.17 
In this article, we explain why attorneys need help in forecasting 
the outcomes of their cases, including what psychologists have 
                                                                                                                 
 14. Id. at 566–67. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See generally Greene & Bornstein, supra note 5, at 31 (reviewing imperfect attorney forecasting 
and legal remedies to improve forecasting). 
 17. Id. 
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learned about why attorneys are poor forecasters.18 In doing so, we 
focus more on damage award determinations than liability 
assessments because the former have more inherent variability and 
uncertainty than the latter and thus, have captured researchers’ 
interest. We also describe the value of conducting small group 
research to address forecasting errors, reveal the real worth of clients’ 
claims, and pave the road to settlement.19 
I.   WHY ATTORNEYS ARE POOR FORECASTERS 
A.   Partisan Distortion 
Attorneys are hired to vigorously represent their clients, regardless 
of their personally held beliefs and intuitions and, as famed defense 
attorney Alan Dershowitz has said, “right up to the edge of what’s 
ethical.”20 This level of partisanship provides ample incentive for 
attorneys to favor their own perspectives, and is likely to lead to 
distorted beliefs about the virtues of their case. Psychological 
concepts can explain why attorneys are partial to the parties they 
represent and how these biases may have lasting and untoward 
effects on their work. 
1.   Role-Induced Bias 
To the extent that attorneys feel optimistic about their side of the 
case, they will put increased weight on the evidence in their favor.21 
People show partisan distortion solely because of the role they are 
fulfilling—namely, as plaintiffs or defendants.22 This fact extends 
beyond attorneys to others involved in litigation, and even experts in 
human behavior are not immune to the effects of role-induced 
                                                                                                                 
 18. See infra Part I. 
 19. See infra Part II. 
 20. Alan Dershowitz, Remarks during Criminal Law class at Harvard Law School (1994) 
(memorandum on file with Georgia State University Law Review). 
 21. Zev J. Eigen & Yair Listokin, Do Lawyers Really Believe Their Own Hype, and Should They? A 
Natural Experiment, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 239, 239–40 (2012). 
 22. Id. at 241. 
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biases.23 For example, given the same case facts, psychological 
experts who believe they have been hired by the prosecution will 
assign higher risk scores to criminal defendants than those who 
believe they have been hired by the defense.24 
One study nicely illustrates how role-induced bias can affect 
attorneys’ choices.25 Researchers Eigen and Listoken randomly 
assigned law students in moot court competitions to represent either 
the respondent or the petitioner in an appellate court case.26 Eigen 
and Listoken found that even with random assignment, role-induced 
bias caused participants to judge the evidence and moral value of 
their arguments as strongly supporting their assigned side.27 
Furthermore, when they compared participants’ legal writing and 
moot court scores as evaluated by law professors, they found that the 
participants who received lower grades had overestimated the 
strength of the evidence in their favor, suggesting that overestimation 
leads to diminished performance on behalf of the client.28 
In a related study, researchers Engel and Glockner explored the 
effects of role-induced bias by asking students attending a graduate 
research institute to assume the part of either defense counsel or 
prosecutor in a criminal case.29 They reviewed the case facts from 
their assigned perspectives, and they were then asked to disentangle 
themselves from that role and imagine how a judge would decide the 
case.30 But even when attempting to view the case in a neutral 
fashion, participants upheld role-induced biases: those previously 
assigned to act as prosecutors deemed the defendant guilty sixteen 
percent more often than those previously assigned to act as defense 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Id. at 242; Daniel C. Murrie et al., Are Forensic Experts Biased by the Side that Retained Them?, 
24 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1889, 1895 (2013). 
 24. Murrie, supra note 23, at 1894–95. 
 25. See Eigen & Listokin, supra note 21. 
 26. Id. at 246 (assigning participants randomly to one side or the other, researchers control for the 
self-selection bias often present in studies that evaluate practicing attorneys who presumably choose to 
represent plaintiffs or defendants because they are naturally inclined that way.) 
 27. Id. at 253–54. 
 28. Id. at 261. 
 29. Christoph Engel & Andreas Glöckner, Role-Induced Bias in Court: An Experimental Analysis, 
26 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 272, 274 (2013). 
 30. Id. at 275. 
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counsel.31 They retained these biases even when they had a medium 
(€5 or U.S.D. $7) or high (€100 or U.S.D. $140) financial incentive 
to review the case in an unbiased way.32 And biases remained even 
when participants were asked to consider the strength of evidence in 
preparation for a plea bargain, as demonstrated by the fact that they 
continued to perceive their own arguments as stronger than their 
opponents’.33 So even when the sole objective was to attempt to settle 
the case in a fair way, participants continued to over-value the 
evidence in support of their initially-assigned role.34 
These findings convincingly show that the degree of bias toward 
one’s own side of a case can be considerable. The biases created by 
assuming a role in a case, whether as defense counsel, prosecutor, or 
plaintiffs’ attorney, can result in a barrier to settlement as each side’s 
evaluation of the evidence and the law favors their clients. 
2.   Confirmation Bias 
Not only are attorneys likely to display biases consistent with the 
parties they represent, but they are also prone to seek out information 
which supports their position while ignoring evidence to the 
contrary.35 Renowned scientists Amos Tversky and Daniel 
Kahneman initially explored these sorts of distortions in decision 
making in the mid-1970s to challenge the commonly held belief that 
human decision making is rational and predictable.36 Tversky and 
Kahneman coined the term heuristics to represent various mental 
shortcuts that people undertake when making decisions that involve 
uncertainty.37 
                                                                                                                 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 275, 278. 
 33. Id. at 279. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Eigen & Listokin, supra note 21, at 243. 
 36. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974). For their collaboration, Kahneman won the Nobel Prize in Economics six 
years after Tversky died; Nobel awards are not given posthumously. NOBELPRIZE.ORG, The Sveriges 
Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2002, http://www.nobelprize.org/
nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2002/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2015). 
 37. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 98 (2011). 
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One such heuristic, the confirmation bias, occurs when individuals 
pay attention to and remember information which tends to support 
their current position or belief and discount or ignore evidence that 
contradicts that belief.38 Applied to attorney decision making, the 
confirmation bias may increase attorneys’ certainty that the evidence 
favors their arguments over those of the opposing party, especially 
because incentives to win the case increase the search for 
confirmatory information.39 
In a series of studies of confirmation bias in legal settings, Rassin, 
Eerland, and Kuijpers asked law student participants to make an 
initial determination of the guilt of a defendant and then to request 
additional police investigations to supplement their case.40 
Participants who believed that the defendant was guilty requested 
information that confirmed the conviction and avoided information 
that seemed to exculpate the defendant.41 Specifically, in one study, 
participants who initially thought the defendant was innocent 
requested additional incriminating information forty-five percent of 
the time, whereas those who thought the defendant was guilty 
requested incriminating information fifty-seven percent of the time.42 
In a follow-up study, Eerland and Rassin evaluated both 
confirmation bias and the feature positive effect on legal judgments.43 
The feature positive effect is the process by which individuals place 
more weight on their ability to secure evidence than they do on the 
inability to secure evidence, even though the latter can be as strong 
an indication of guilt or innocence as the former.44 Law student 
participants read a vignette, which described a fistfight, and then 
were randomly assigned to read additional case materials in which 
investigators had sought either incriminating or exculpating evidence, 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Andrew J. Wistrich & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, How Lawyers’ Intuitions Prolong Litigation, 86 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 571, 595 (2013). 
 39. Id. at 594–95. 
 40. Eric Rassin et al., Let’s Find the Evidence: An Analogue Study of Confirmation Bias in Criminal 
Investigations, 7 J. INVESTIGATIVE PSYCHOL. & OFFENDER PROFILING. 231, 234 (2010). 
 41. Id. at 238. 
 42. Id. at 237–38. 
 43. Anita Eerland & Eric Rassin, Biased Evaluation of Incriminating and Exonerating 
(Non)evidence, 18 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 351, 351 (2012). 
 44. See id. at 351–52. 
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and the investigators either found this additional evidence or did 
not.45 Confirmation bias was evident in that participants’ guilt ratings 
increased when they were first presented with incriminating evidence 
and later presented with additional incriminating evidence, and their 
ratings were unaffected when exculpating evidence followed 
incriminating evidence.46 Presumably, they ignored the exculpatory 
evidence because it failed to confirm their preexisting opinions of 
guilt. In other words, participants gave value to the information that 
supported their initial position, but ignored information that seemed 
to refute it. Furthermore, verdicts were more strongly influenced 
when investigators tried to find additional incriminating information 
and were successful than when they tried to find this information and 
were unsuccessful.47 Although the absence of evidence should be 
equally dispositive of guilt and innocence, participants put less 
weight on the absence of evidence than on its presence. 
The confirmation bias can distort the ways in which attorneys 
collect and evaluate evidence and information, giving supporting 
evidence additional weight, while ignoring or undervaluing 
contradictory evidence.48 This process can lead to increased and 
unwarranted certainty in the strength of one’s own perspective, and 
result in unwillingness to negotiate a settlement.49 The act of seeking 
out only that information which confirms one’s own position creates 
an additional barrier to settlement. 
3.   Anchoring-and-Adjustment Heuristic 
Attorneys also fall prey to the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic 
that occurs when individuals must make a decision about a quantity 
under conditions of uncertainty.50 To manage their uncertainty, 
people seek some type of tentative initial estimate or anchor, and 
                                                                                                                 
 45. Id. at 353 (explaining that students in the Netherlands study law at both the undergraduate and 
graduate levels). 
 46. Id. at 355. 
 47. Id. at 356. 
 48. Wistrich & Rachlinski, supra note 38, at 605–06. 
 49. Id. at 611. 
 50. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 36, at 1129. 
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through a process of adjustment, base subsequent decisions on this 
estimate.51 But anchors can often be radically off the mark and 
adjustments are typically insufficient.52 
The anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic influences decision 
making by biasing individuals in the direction of a figure suggested 
by the anchor.53 Making an adjustment from this anchor is difficult 
because even if individuals obtain additional information and 
recognize that the initial estimate is far off target, their subsequent 
adjustments remain close to the initial anchor point.54 To complicate 
matters further, the choice of anchor is typically self-serving and 
therefore biased toward a desired, rather than a likely, outcome.55 
Anchoring-and-adjustment occurs in civil litigation when the 
amount of money requested in settlement or at trial acts as an anchor, 
influencing the amount that participants are willing to award.56 In a 
mock jury study, researchers found that when participants were asked 
to award damages to a plaintiff who developed ovarian cancer from 
birth control use, the amount requested by the plaintiff, the so-called 
ad damnum, influenced awards.57 The plaintiff who requested the 
exorbitant sum of $1 billion in damages received more than the 
plaintiff who requested just $5 million.58 
Attorneys are not immune to this shortcut in reasoning and are 
likely to base judgments of anticipated settlements or jury damage 
awards on initially calculated or provided figures (anchors) rather 
than on likely outcomes. 59 To demonstrate the anchoring-and-
adjustment heuristic in attorney decision making, researchers Fox 
                                                                                                                 
 51. Id. at 1128. 
 52. Id. at 1126, 1128. 
 53. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 37, at 119–20. 
 54. Edie Greene & Leslie Ellis, Decision Making in Criminal Justice, in APPLYING PSYCHOLOGY TO 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 183, 193–94 (David Carson et al. eds., 2007). 
 55. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2467, 
2498 (2004). 
 56. See Birte Englich, Blind or Biased? Justitia’s Susceptibility to Anchoring Effects in the 
Courtroom Based on Given Numerical Representations, 28 LAW & POL’Y 497, 500 (2006) (reviewing 
the effects of anchoring on participants’ perceptions of settlement awards in civil litigation). 
 57. Gretchen B. Chapman & Brian H. Bornstein, The More You Ask For, the More You Get: 
Anchoring in Personal Injury Verdicts, 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCH. 519, 522 (1996). 
 58. Id. at 525. 
 59. See Bibas, supra note 55, at 2520, 2529. 
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and Birke had attorneys read a case summary of an automobile 
accident.60 Then the researchers assigned attorneys to one of four 
groups and asked them to determine the likelihood of a jury verdict 
within a specified range: group 1: less than $25,000; group 2: 
between $25,000 and $50,000; group 3: between $50,000 and 
$100,000; group 4: more than $100,000.61 If they were reasoning in a 
completely rational way, attorneys would have determined the value 
of a case through careful evaluation of the evidence rather than in 
response to the award ranges provided.62 In that way, the 
probabilities of verdicts falling within the four ranges would sum to 
100%.63 Recall that attorneys read the same fact pattern so regardless 
of the range they were provided, they should generally predict a 
similar award. Those whose assigned range included that amount 
should rate the probability of achieving an award within their range 
as high, while all other participants should rate the likelihood of an 
award within their range as low.64 However, the combined 
probabilities of the four outcomes added to 178%, indicating that 
attorneys anchored on the amounts provided and adjusted their 
responses insufficiently.65 Focusing on the figure provided by 
researchers reduced their ability to adequately consider alternatives.66 
When attorneys focus inordinately on some preconceived 
settlement or damages amount and anchor on this goal, it becomes 
difficult to seriously consider other outcomes and especially difficult 
to forecast a less desirable outcome—including one that is more 
realistic.67 This bias can create a barrier to settlement, since 
settlement amounts offered by adversaries will typically seem 
insufficient when compared with the desired award. 
                                                                                                                 
 60. Craig R. Fox & Richard Birke, Forecasting Trial Outcomes: Lawyers Assign Higher Probability 
to Possibilities that Are Described in Greater Detail, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 159, 163 (2002). 
 61. Id. at 164. 
 62. See id. at 169. 
 63. Id. at 164. 
 64. See id. at 169. 
 65. Id. at 164. 
 66. Fox & Birke, supra note 60, at 169. 
 67. Id. at 169. 
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4.   Endowment Effect 
By now, it should be clear that attorneys’ perceptions of “fair” 
settlements are colored by partisan biases including, for example, 
whether their clients are plaintiffs or defendants. This phenomenon 
can be explained in part by the endowment effect. According to this 
tendency, individuals perceive an item to be worth more if it belongs 
to them.68 For example, the marketing strategy to allow a two-week 
money-back-guarantee likely works because once the buyer takes 
ownership of an item, its perceived value increases immediately.69 
The buyer is then unwilling to return the item for cash, believing the 
item to be worth more than what was paid.70 
The endowment effect is relevant to both litigators and their clients 
who, because they believe in the merits of their case, are likely to 
have a distorted notion of what the case is worth.71 This becomes 
problematic when plaintiffs’ overvaluation leads to an unwillingness 
to settle for a lesser, more reasonable amount and defendants’ 
undervaluation leads to an unwillingness to offer that amount. Rather 
than taking an evenhanded approach by offering and accepting a 
compromise award, litigants assume—often incorrectly—that jurors 
will see things their way.72 Hence, they hold out for the preferred but 
illusory resolution.73 
To demonstrate this effect, a group of researchers randomly 
assigned participants to act as plaintiffs or defendants in an 
automobile liability case.74 Participants who were assigned to act as 
plaintiffs estimated that judges’ settlement awards would be higher 
and deemed a larger settlement as more fair than participants 
assigned to act as defendants.75 So when individuals perceive 
something as theirs (i.e., the money they believe they are owed as 
                                                                                                                 
 68. Barry Goldman, The Psychology of Settlement, PRAC. LITIGATOR, Jul. 2006, at 36. 
 69. Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 
46 (1980). 
 70. Id. 
 71. See Loewenstein et al., supra note 3, at 138. 
 72. Id. at 138–39. 
 73. Id. at 138. 
 74. Id. at 145. 
 75. Id. at 151. 
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compensation for their injuries), they deem the items as higher in 
value than if those things had not belonged to them.76 This bias can 
serve as yet another barrier to settlement. 
B.   Overconfidence 
Confidence judgments are a component of any assessment of the 
chances of winning and losing.77 Lawyers consider the probabilities 
of wins and losses when deciding whether it is wise to enter into 
settlement negotiations and whether to accept or decline a settlement 
offer,78 and the confidence they attach to their choice is part and 
parcel of the decision making process. For many of the reasons we 
have already outlined, lawyers are unable to make good predictions 
about case outcomes, which hinders their performance in settlement 
talks and at trial. 79 Yet their poor performance is rarely accompanied 
by a crisis in confidence.80 
Overconfidence impairs attorneys’ abilities to forecast case 
outcomes.81 In a demonstration of this problem, researcher 
Goodman-Delahunty and her colleagues recruited nearly 500 civil 
and criminal attorneys and asked them to predict their chances of 
achieving a minimum win in a real-life case set for trial.82 When 
researchers contacted the attorneys after the cases were resolved and 
compared predictions with reality, they found that attorneys who had 
forecast a high probability of winning were clearly overconfident.83 
Among the subset of lawyers who rated their chances of winning as 
very high, the mean probability-of-a-win estimate was eighty-two 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Id. at 153. 
 77. See Lisa K. Son & Bennett L. Schwartz, The Relation Between Metacognitive Monitoring and 
Control, in APPLIED METACOGNITION 15, 29–30 (Timothy J. Perfect & Bennett L. Schwartz, eds., 
2002). 
 78. Goodman-Delahunty et al., supra note 7, at 134 (“Attorneys make decisions about future courses 
of action, such as whether to take on a new client, the value of a case, whether to advise the client to 
enter into settlement negotiations, and whether to accept a settlement offer or proceed to trial.”). 
 79. Id. at 135. 
 80. Id. at 133. 
 81. Id. at 135. 
 82. Id. at 138–39. 
 83. Greene & Bornstein, supra note 5, at 30. 
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percent, yet only sixty-two percent achieved their goal.84 Not only 
did predictions not match reality, but the most biased predictions 
were associated with the most overconfidence, a finding consistent 
with previous research showing overconfidence in a range of 
judgments.85 
Surprisingly, researchers also found that more experienced 
attorneys were not better calibrated—meaning they were not better 
able to assess the likelihood of future outcomes—than less 
experienced attorneys.86 There are a number of reasons why: first, 
more experienced lawyers may handle more complex and ambiguous 
cases than their less experienced counterparts,87 and overconfidence 
is greater in more challenging situations.88 The differences in case 
complexity present an apples and oranges problem in that more and 
less experienced attorneys may be predicting the outcomes of 
different sorts of lawsuits.89 Second, the desire to portray a highly 
confident professional persona may incline lawyers to become 
overconfident over time.90 In addition, lawyers receive relatively 
little feedback in actual adversarial settings.91 Even senior partners in 
litigation firms, typically the most confident litigators, are not often 
subject to third-party review or feedback during their years of 
practice.92 Lacking any rigorous critique, litigators become overly 
confident of their positions, which prevents them from accurately 
assessing the likelihood of winning their cases, monitoring their 
predictions, or deciding whether to continue to invest resources in a 
case or to settle.93 
                                                                                                                 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Gerd Gigerenzer et al., Probabilistic Mental Models: A Brunswikian Theory of Confidence, 
98 PSYCHOL. REV. 506 (1991); Don A. Moore & Paul J. Healy, The Trouble with Overconfidence, 115 
PSYCHOL. REV. 502 (2008). 
 86. Goodman-Delahunty et al., supra note 7, at 149. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Moore & Healy, supra note 85, at 504. 
 89. See Goodman-Delahunty et al., supra note 7, at 149, 153. 
 90. Id. at 149. 
 91. Greene & Bornstein, supra note 5, at 31. 
 92. Goodman-Delahunty et al., supra note 7, at 152. 
 93. Id. 
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When attorneys are asked to provide reasons as to why they might 
not achieve their desired outcomes, they sometimes, though not 
always, show improved calibration.94 They seem to be able to rein in 
their confidence when making judgments about simulated cases but 
cannot do so when predicting outcomes of their own cases.95 
Apparently the greater the investment that attorneys have in a case, 
the less successful are interventions intended to aid their judgments.96 
1.   Self-Serving Biases in Confidence Judgments 
Other factors underlie attorneys’ overconfidence. In making 
predictions about case outcomes, attorneys can fall victim to a self-
serving bias—the tendency for people to see what benefits them as 
what is also most fair.97 This bias can be produced by attorneys’ 
allegiances to their clients and commitment to their case98 and, in a 
litigation setting, can be a strong predictor of the decision to proceed 
to trial rather than settle.99 
One result of the self-serving bias is that lawyers engage in wishful 
thinking: believing that a certain outcome is more probable because 
of the desire to achieve it.100 Such over-optimism can also result in an 
inability to see viable alternatives.101 As we have noted, when 
lawyers judge the probability of achieving particular trial outcomes, 
they tend to focus on the outcome they desire most and ignore 
                                                                                                                 
 94. Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-
Serving Biases, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1997, at 109, 115. 
 95. See Goodman-Delahunty et al., supra note 7, at 151. 
 96. See id. (“The discrepancy between our finding and the previous finding may be due to the fact 
that the participants in our study made judgments about their own cases rather than simulated cases 
assigned to them in an experimental setting. A more profound investment in the outcome in real-life 
cases may increase resistance to debiasing interventions.”). 
 97. See Babcock & Loewenstein, supra note 94, at 110 (“This is the tendency for parties to arrive at 
judgments that reflect a self-serving bias—to conflate what is fair with what benefits oneself.”). 
 98. See Goodman-Delahunty et al., supra note 7, at 151 (“A lawyer’s commitment to the client and 
the case may induce a self-serving bias.”). 
 99. See Loewenstein et al., supra note 3, at 138. 
 100. See Elisha Babad et al., Factors Influencing Wishful Thinking and Predictions of Election 
Outcomes, 13 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 461, 461 (1992); Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated 
Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 480 (1990). 
 101. Goodman-Delahunty et al., supra note 7, at 150–51 (“Generation of a particular mental scenario 
may have hindered the later generation of alternative, incompatible scenarios.”). 
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undesirable outcomes.102 A study we mentioned earlier, in which 
attorneys were asked to judge the probability of a particular jury 
verdict in a simulated automobile negligence case, demonstrated this 
phenomenon.103 Lawyers overestimated the probability of a specific 
outcome because the award range they were provided weakened their 
ability to examine alternatives.104 Ignoring alternatives can obviously 
cause lawyers to give their clients poor advice, such as accepting “an 
unreasonably lower amount in settlement than is warranted.”105 
2.   Perceptions of Control and Desires for Self-Esteem 
Events that are perceived as more controllable are likely to be 
associated with overconfidence.106 Lawyers often feel that trial 
outcomes are under their control—that the outcome is a function of 
their hard work, knowledge of the law, and skill.107 Many external 
factors, however, affect how a case winds up.108 The inability to 
appreciate the extent to which these factors—including biased 
judges, unreliable or unimpressive witnesses, unrepresentative or 
unpredictable jurors—can affect trial outcomes will cause attorneys 
to inappropriately value their own abilities.109 This illusion of control 
results in errant judgments of the likelihood of success.110 
Human beings also tend to hold overly positive views of their 
personal characteristics and motivations.111 Negotiators believe 
                                                                                                                 
 102. See discussion supra Part I.A.2. 
 103. Fox & Birke, supra note 60, at 163; see also discussion supra Part I.A.3. 
 104. See Fox & Birke, supra note 60, at 163–64. 
 105. Goodman-Delahunty et al., supra note 7, at 135. 
 106. See Neil D. Weinstein, Reducing Unrealistic Optimism About Illness Susceptibility, 2 HEALTH 
PSYCHOL. 11, 14 (1983); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 808, 814 (1980); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About 
Susceptibility for Health Problems, 5 J. BEHAV. MED. 441, 443, 450 (1982). 
 107. See Greene & Bornstein, supra note 5, at 31. 
 108. See, e.g., Goodman-Delahunty et al., supra note 7, at 153. 
 109. See David Dunning et al., The Overconfidence Effect in Social Predictions, 58 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSCHYOL. 568, 569 (1990). 
 110. Ellen J. Langer, The Illusion of Control, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSCHYOL. 311, 327 (1975) 
(“This illusion [of control] may be induced by introducing competition, choice, stimulus or response 
familiarity, or passive or active involvement into a chance situation. When these factors are present, 
people are more confident and are more likely to take risks.”). 
 111. Roderick M. Kramer et al., Self-Enhancement Biases and Negotiator Judgment: Effects of Self-
Esteem and Mood, 56 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 110, 112 (1993). 
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themselves to be more reasonable, competent, honest, and flexible, 
among other things, than their counterparts.112 Self-enhancing biases 
of this sort can cause attorneys to believe that because they have 
more skills than their adversary, they should hold out for a more 
favorable case outcome.113 
C.   Mistaken Beliefs About Allocating Resources 
1.   Under-Resourcing 
Like other busy professionals, litigators make strategic decisions 
about how to invest their time and other resources, and opt to focus 
attention on some cases rather than others. This choice is colored by 
a variety of factors, including attorneys’ perceptions of the 
complexity of the issues, the likelihood of settlement (distorted 
though it may be), clients’ insistence, and their current workload.114 
Obviously, there are consequences to these choices, and attorneys 
may have difficulty forecasting case outcomes as a function of their 
familiarity or lack thereof, with the evidence and relevant law in a 
particular case.115 
Attorneys sometimes delay settling a case because they have not 
adequately familiarized themselves with the facts and legal issues.116 
Such disengagement from the process means that these attorneys will 
not know whether to invest their time or effort in preparing for 
settlement negotiations or a trial.117 This scenario can cause cases to 
drag on for years, which also means that expenses will increase 
unnecessarily.118 
                                                                                                                 
 112. Id. at 120. 
 113. Id. at 114. 
 114. See Goodman-Delahunty et al., supra note 7, at 149, 152. 
 115. See Langer, supra note 110, at 323. 
 116. Ken Broda-Bahm, Break Through the Barriers: The Settlement Series, Part One, PERSUASIVE 
LITIGATOR (June 4, 2012), http://www.persuasivelitigator.com/2012/06/break-through-the-barriers-
settlement-series-part-one.html. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
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2.   Over-Resourcing and the Sunk-Cost Fallacy 
At the other extreme, lawyers become too invested in a case and 
may succumb to what is known as the sunk-cost fallacy—the 
tendency to continue pursuit of a goal after time, money, or effort has 
been invested—even if it would be advisable to abandon pursuit of 
that goal.119 Pouring resources into any enterprise, particularly those 
that involve ambiguity and alternative interpretations, has the effect 
of blurring reality in the direction that one favors.120 Attorneys who 
invest indiscriminately in their adversarial positions are likely to fall 
prey to this process.121 
When making decisions about resource investments in a particular 
case, a fully rational attorney should take into account only future 
costs and benefits and not consider past costs, which, cannot be 
recouped.122 The expenses of litigation, including fees paid to 
investigators, paralegals, and experts, as well as attorneys’ own time 
are sunk costs which, for most litigants, can never be recovered.123 
But these expenditures lead inexorably to a reduced likelihood of 
settlement, as settling would entail admitting that mistakes were 
made and resources were squandered.124 At this point, it simply 
becomes easier to adhere to the original plan and to devote yet more 
time and money in the hopes of succeeding, even though the 
probability of winning may be low.125 
                                                                                                                 
 119. See Hal R. Arkes & Catherine Blumer, The Psychology of Sunk Cost, 35 ORGANIZATIONAL 
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 124, 124 (1985). 
 120. Id. at 137. 
 121. See, e.g., Wistrich & Rachlinski, supra note 38, at 602. 
 122. See Hal R. Arkes & Laura Hutzel, The Role of Probability of Success Estimates in the Sunk Cost 
Effect, 13 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 295, 295 (2000). 
 123. See id. 
 124. See Jay Folberg et al., Use of ADR in California Courts: Findings and Proposals, 26 U.S.F. L. 
REV. 343, 369 (1992) (“[A]s a case progresses, ‘sunk costs’ and emotional preparation for trial make 
settlement more difficult.”); Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About 
Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 113–14 (1990). 
 125. See Daniel Friedman et al., Searching for the Sunk Cost Fallacy, 10 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 79, 
83 (2007) (“Self-justification (or cognitive dissonance) induces people who have sunk resources into an 
unprofitable activity to irrationally revise their beliefs about the profitability of an additional investment, 
in order to avoid the unpleasant acknowledgement that they made a mistake and wasted the sunk 
resources. Loss aversion (with respect to a reference point fixed before the costs were sunk) might 
induce people to choose an additional investment whose incremental return has negative expected value 
but still has some chance of allowing a positive return on the overall investment.”). 
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In one study of the sunk-cost fallacy, insurance lawyers were told 
that they were representing the plaintiff in a simulated breach-of-
contract case involving the delivery of defective machines used in 
fabricating semiconductors.126 They were informed that the defendant 
had offered to settle the case for $480,000.127 Half of the participants 
were then informed that they had already “spent” $90,000 in costs 
and fees litigating the case, and the other half were told that they had 
“spent” $420,000 to date.128 Given that the defendant’s offer was 
$50,000 higher than the expected value of a jury’s verdict, a rational 
choice would be to settle, regardless of the extent of sunk costs.129 
The data showed otherwise: seventy-six percent of lawyers who had 
“spent” $90,000 recommended settling, whereas only forty-five 
percent of those who had “spent” $420,000 recommended settling.130 
Their assessments of the case were influenced by the amount of 
money they had already spent on litigation.131 
D.   Other Barriers to Settlement 
1.   Managing Clients’ Preferences and Expectations 
Attorneys obviously play a crucial role in advising clients about 
when to settle, when to proceed to trial, and whether a better 
settlement offer might be forthcoming or should be offered to settle 
the case.132 However, clients are the ultimate arbiters of whether to 
accept or reject proposed settlements and whether to offer more or to 
stand firm.133 Therefore, it is imperative that attorneys be able to 
                                                                                                                 
 126. See Wistrich & Rachlinski, supra note 38, at 616. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 617. 
 129. Id. at 616–17. 
 130. Id. at 617. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 213–14 
(1987) (examining attorney knowledge of case, which clients may not understand or possess, making 
attorney advice especially important in client decision making); William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and 
Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones’s Case, 50 MD. L. REV. 213, 213 (1991) (discussing attorney influence 
over client decision making). 
 133. See Wistrich & Rachlinski, supra note 38, at 578. 
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provide unbiased perspectives to their clients, especially in cases that 
are highly emotional, hotly contested, or financially valuable. 
There are a number of reasons why clients would hesitate to 
contemplate settling. They may fear that changing one’s mind or 
considering less desirable (but realistic) outcomes will be perceived 
as a sign of weakness.134 They may possess a desire for vindication, 
aim to hold the other party responsible, believe that they have done 
no wrong, or suspect that the complaining party has over-reached.135 
They may have had certain expectations for how litigation would 
proceed, and deviations from this plan can be difficult to accept.136 
These hesitations and personal desires, whether warranted or not, can 
serve as obstacles to settlement that must be navigated carefully by 
counsel. 
Ideally, attorneys would be aware of their own decision making 
limitations and able to manage clients’ expectations so that 
collectively, they could consider alternative outcomes and make the 
best choices possible as to how to proceed. But the biases we have 
described are difficult to overcome. To remedy these problems, 
attorneys can use outside resources, such as small group research 
conducted by trial consultants, to assist them in overcoming 
forecasting errors and make better-calibrated settlement decisions.137 
II.   USING SMALL GROUP RESEARCH TO REMEDY IMPERFECT 
FORECASTING 
Attorneys are not immune to the age-old adage that two heads are 
better than one. Collaboration, particularly with unbiased others, can 
provide the information necessary to make smart decisions. 
Attorneys can garner these insights through small group research 
(SGR), conducted either in-house or by litigation consultants, which 
                                                                                                                 
 134. See Eigen & Listokin, supra note 21, at 243; Kenneth P. Nolan, Settlement Negotiations, 
LITIGATION, Summer 1985, at 17 (noting that lawyers also suffer from this fear). 
 135. See, e.g., Gross & Syverud, supra note 9, at 366 (discussing the disparities between going to trial 
and settling in malpractice cases). 
 136. Id. 
 137. See discussion infra Part II. 
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allows them to preview cases before ever stepping into a 
courtroom.138 Plaintiffs and defendants use litigation consultants and 
SGR for different reasons: the former need to know how much their 
case is worth and whether to settle, and the latter should know the 
risks associated with going to trial versus settling.139 Although SGR 
does not provide crystal-ball-like predictions, these exercises can 
shed light on the strengths and weaknesses of a case and move the 
lawsuit closer to resolution.140 
A.   Types of Small Group Research 
1.   Mock Trials 
Mock trials are similar to actual trials in that they include opening 
statements and closing arguments as well as direct- and cross-
examination of plaintiffs, defendants, lay and expert witnesses, 
though most of these are abbreviated.141 Surrogate jurors, 
representative of the actual jury pool, hear a subset of relevant jury 
instructions and deliberate to a verdict.142 Their deliberations 
typically occur behind a one-way mirror or in a room with filming 
capabilities to allow interested parties to watch the process in real-
time, ask questions, and give suggestions.143 Budgetary and time 
constraints often dictate that these steps be condensed, so full-blown 
mock trials are reserved primarily for high profile and high stakes 
cases that justify the costs.144 
                                                                                                                 
 138. Diane F. Wyzga, Small Group Research from Recruit to Report, AM. ASS’N FOR JUST., 
https://www.justice.org/sections/newsletters/articles/small-group-research-recruit-report (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2015). 
 139. Jay M. Finkelman, Litigation Consulting: Expanding Beyond Jury Selection to Trial Strategy 
and Tactics, 62 CONSULTING PSYCH. J. 12, 13 (2010) (“Plaintiffs typically want to know how much 
their case is worth, in part to determine whether it is worth taking but also to gauge how much is prudent 
to expend (in both time and money) in its prosecution. Defendants are more likely to want to determine 
the risk of litigation and, by inference, the utility of settlement.”). 
 140. See Wyzga, supra note 138. 
 141. Finkelman, supra note 139, at 16. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
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Mock trials can be exploratory or confirmatory.145 Exploratory 
mock trials give insight into jurors’ evaluations of the evidence and 
perceptions of witnesses, and information about which themes, 
exhibits, and arguments are most persuasive.146 Typically only 
twenty-four to thirty-six surrogate jurors are involved in an 
exploratory mock trial, making this exercise less than ideal for 
determining case outcomes.147 Confirmatory mock trials, on the other 
hand, fill this role.148 
Confirmatory mock trials have two objectives: provide insight into 
the process that jurors will use, given the evidence and the relevant 
law, to make their decisions, and suggest the likely trial outcome.149 
They also help assess jurors’ receptivity to contemplated case themes 
or theories and give the first clues about how certain types of jurors 
will respond, suggesting potential strategies for voir dire.150 This type 
of mock trial involves more surrogate jurors than an exploratory 
mock trial (i.e., thirty-six or more across multiple sessions) and better 
simulates an actual trial.151 
Both varieties enable the parties to evaluate jurors’ use of 
demonstrative evidence and provide opportunities for attorneys to 
practice multimedia presentations.152 In general, the value of a mock 
trial is directly related to how well (or poorly) the mock jurors match 
the actual jurors on certain key features,153 a point to which we will 
return.154 
                                                                                                                 
 145. See CINDY K. ANDREWS, BENEFITS, RISKS AND MISPERCEPTIONS OF MOCK TRIALS AND 
MIRROR JURIES 1, available at http://www.thefederation.org/documents/15.-Benefits%20Risks%20
Mock%20Trials.pdf (last visited May 13, 2015). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. ANDREWS, supra note 145, at 1. 
 152. Id. at 4. 
 153. Barry Richard, Corporate Litigation: Mock Jury Exercises, 26 NAT. L. J., Mar. 1, 2004, 
available at http://www2.gtlaw.com/pub/articles/2004/richardb04a.pdf. 
 154. See infra Part II.B.3. 
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2.   Focus Groups  
In contrast to mock trials that test all facets of a particular case, 
focus groups are intended to test jurors’ reactions to specific issues or 
witnesses in a case.155 These also come in two varieties: concept 
focus groups and structured focus groups.156 Concept focus groups 
are used early in the development of a case to assist attorneys in 
constructing a narrative of the evidence, developing trial themes, 
learning about potential biases that may arise during trial, and 
gleaning insights into areas of discovery that are deserving of further 
attention.157 Informal in nature, they involve trial consultants or 
attorneys telling the group a bit about the dispute, evaluating their 
reactions, and asking what questions arose regarding the evidence.158 
Structured focus groups, by contrast, involve more formal 
presentations of the facts and arguments.159 They can also test the 
“staying power” of themes or strategies that may be offered by the 
other side.160 Typically, they start with the trial consultant explaining 
the objective of the session and establishing group confidentiality.161 
Trial counsel then make abbreviated presentations of the evidence, 
sometimes in the form of a “clopening” (a brief opening statement 
combined with an equally brief closing argument), and the trial 
consultant acts as moderator.162 Structured focus groups can also 
include deliberations, moderator-led discussions, or both.163 
3.   Shadow Juries 
A shadow jury involves surrogate jurors responding in real time to 
the evidence actually presented during a trial and deliberating as if 
                                                                                                                 
 155. Douglas L. Keene, The “Why” and “How” of Focus Group Research, JURY EXPERT, Aug. 2013, 
at 16, 16. 
 156. Id. at 17. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Keene, supra note 155, at 17. 
 162. Id. at 17–18. 
 163. Id. at 18. 
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they were the real jury.164 Like mock trials, shadow jury studies can 
be expensive so are usually reserved for high profile or high stakes 
cases.165 However, when costs are an issue, they can also be used 
strategically during certain portions of a trial, such as during the 
presentation of key witnesses or after opening statements.166 
One method of organizing a shadow jury is to have the shadow 
jurors, who are representative of the pool of prospective jurors like 
mock jurors, sit in the audience during a trial.167 This arrangement 
enables shadow jurors to see and hear almost exactly what the actual 
jury is seeing and hearing.168 After each court session, “shadow 
jurors are brought together by the consultant away from the 
courtroom and asked a variety of questions about the day’s 
proceedings.”169 Attorneys can watch the consultant question the 
shadow jurors through a one-way mirror or via video; in some 
instances, attorneys are present in the room with the jurors and trial 
consultant.170 
Consultants will typically ask the shadow jurors about their 
leanings toward the plaintiff or defendant at the end of each day.171 
This information suggests what strategic tweaks should be made in 
the following day’s session and can be highly useful for monitoring 
the progress of a trial.172 Because shadow jurors are often unaware of 
which side has employed them, their feedback can be relatively 
unbiased.173 
                                                                                                                 
 164. See Finkelman, supra note 139, at 16. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Diana G. Ratcliff, Using Trial Consultants: What Practitioners Need to Know, 4 J. LEGAL 
ADVOC. & PRAC. 32, 42 (2002). 
 167. See Finkelman, supra note 139, at 16. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See ANDREWS, supra note 145, at 10. 
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B.   Rigorous Methodology Enhances the Value of Small Group 
Research 
An attorney or consultant can conduct weeks or months of SGR, 
but the results will be of little value if the research is flawed. As 
researchers say, garbage in, garbage out. To be effective, the studies 
must be well designed and the results should be interpreted with 
caution.174 
Although attorneys and their staff can conduct in-house studies, 
some research has shown that attorneys give less weight to a second 
opinion from another attorney than they give to their own 
opinions.175 So hiring unbiased, experienced professionals to evaluate 
the strengths and weaknesses of a case may be wise as they can 
provide nuanced insights not gleaned from other sources. 
The American Society of Trial Consultants (ASTC) has 
established guiding principles for conducting SGR.176 The goal is to 
follow the rules of sound research methodology, common to all 
scientific endeavors.177 Typically, this includes identifying adequate 
or representative participant samples, ensuring that participants are 
unaware of the purpose of the study, and presenting uniform or 
comparable information to all participants.178 When applying these 
general prerequisites to pending litigation, additional factors should 
also be considered.179 It is here that litigation consultants can be most 
valuable because they can ensure that the research meets these 
specific requirements and therefore, that attorneys can appropriately 
rely on the research’s conclusions to inform decisions about 
settlements and trials.180 
                                                                                                                 
 174. See id. at 2. 
 175. Jonas Jacobson et al., Predicting Civil Jury Verdicts: How Attorneys Use (and Misuse) a Second 
Opinion, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 99, 113 (2011). 
 176. AM. SOC’Y OF TRIAL CONSULTANTS, THE PROFESSIONAL CODE OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF 
TRIAL CONSULTANTS 36–40 (2013), available at https://astcweb.org/Resources/Pictures/
ASTCFullCodeFINAL20131.pdf. 
 177. ANDREWS, supra note 145, at 8. 
 178. See id. at 10–11; see also Finkelman, supra note 139, at 16. 
 179. See ANDREWS, supra note 145, at 2 (noting that attorneys should also consider consultants’ 
training in psychometrics and statistics in the hiring process to ensure SGR is conducted appropriately). 
 180. Id. 
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1.   Equal Weight Should Be Given to Both Sides of the Case 
In high-quality SGR, both sides of the case are represented as 
strongly as possible.181 It would be of little use for an attorney to 
present her best evidence, and then lackadaisically construct a 
counterargument.182 This would be akin to the New York Yankees 
hosting a home run derby against the local little league team. Rather 
than setting themselves up for a “home run,” attorneys should hope 
that participants recognize the virtues of the opponent’s case.183 This 
will allow them to anticipate and respond to the strongest possible 
case presentation that the opponent can muster. 
2.   Participants Should Not Know Which Side Is Conducting the 
Research 
For the results of SGR to be meaningful, it is imperative that 
participants be unaware of (or, in research parlance, “blind to”) 
which party is conducting the research.184 If participants are able to 
identify which side is presenting the information and seeking their 
opinions, their responses may be biased toward that side in an effort 
to be agreeable “colleagues.”185 Researchers should make every 
effort to keep confidential the identity of the research conveners in 
order to increase the likelihood that participants will respond in a 
neutral fashion.186 Participants who feel free to give open and honest 
feedback provide more useful information than do those who try to 
appease the researchers. 
                                                                                                                 
 181. Carolyn S. Koch, Improving the Odds: Using Mock Trials to Hone Strategies, 24 TRIAL LAW. 
116, 117 (2001). 
 182. Theodore O. Prosise & Craig C. New, Ten Key Questions: Evaluating the Quality of Mock Trial 
Research, FOR THE DEFENSE, Aug. 2007, at 10, 12. (“If the goal is to get a more accurate assessment of 
settlement value, then balance is essential.”). 
 183. See Koch, supra note 181, at 117. In fact, the third author recently worked with an attorney who 
asked for, indeed hoped for, the harshest possible criticism of his case from SGR participants. 
 184. See Prosise & New, supra note 182, at 13. 
 185. Id. (“If the research participants know whom they are ‘working for,’ the ‘good subjects’ 
phenomenon—the phenomenon of research participants attempting to give the answers they think the 
researcher wants to hear—could color the ultimate outcome.”). 
 186. Cf. id. (explaining that when participants know which side the researchers align with, the 
participants are more likely to give the answers they think the researchers want to hear). 
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3.   Participants Should Be Representative of Prospective Jurors 
It is also important that researchers draw participants from the pool 
of jurors who are eligible to sit on the jury.187 If this key component 
is lacking, the opinions expressed by the group may not match those 
of jurors in the courtroom.188 Attorneys or consultants should become 
familiar with the demographics of the community and the jury pool 
and select research participants that will closely mirror the races, 
ages, socioeconomic statuses, and employment backgrounds of 
prospective jurors.189 Careful selection of participants will increase 
confidence that the results of the research can be trusted and relied on 
in formulating ongoing litigation strategy.190 
Along this vein, people should not participate in SGR if they 
would be excluded from the actual jury.191 For instance, individuals 
who have their morning coffee with one of the parties involved and 
those with specialized knowledge about a key issue in the case would 
be unlikely to survive jury selection and should not be used to gauge 
community opinion in any pretrial research. Creating an environment 
that parallels reality is key to creating trustworthy results.192 
C.   How Small Group Research Can Improve Forecasting 
One trial consultant has written that “[o]nly a mock trial can arm 
an attorney with the kind of information that can make the difference 
between a ringing victory and a devastating loss.”193 Although we 
believe that research projects short of full-blown mock trials also 
have value, there is little dispute that the more an attorney is able to 
invest, financially and otherwise, in SGR, the better the chances for 
improved forecasting.194 These exercises can challenge attorneys’ 
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biases and improve their forecasting abilities, allowing them to 
develop and test case themes, identify jurors of interest, determine 
whether it is advisable to settle or proceed to trial, and approximate 
the value of the case.195 With results of SGR in mind, attorneys can 
gauge how much time, money, and other resources to invest in a case 
and can begin to align themselves and their decisions with the likely 
resolution of the dispute.196 
When is the ideal time to undertake the research that will lead to 
these outcomes? Although SGR can be conducted at any point prior 
to trial, there is reason to collect data early and continue to adapt trial 
strategies throughout the litigation process.197 There are several ways 
that research conducted early in the process can enhance litigation 
practices.198 
1.   Developing Trial Strategies 
Different strategies can be tested with different groups of research 
participants to determine whether one version presents the evidence 
in a more persuasive manner than others.199 It is not uncommon for a 
consultant to conduct one version of a focus group at Time 1 and a 
variant with a different emphasis, altered chronology, or novel 
arrangement of witnesses at Time 2.200 One consultant tells the story 
of an attorney who wanted to focus on the “sexy issue,” a 
whistleblower’s claim, and downplay the “boring issue,” the breach 
of implied contract claim.201 However, mock trial research showed 
that jurors favored the client on the breach of contract claim because 
the evidence was clearly in his favor.202 Using this information, the 
attorney was able to restructure the case to focus on the issue best 
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supported by the evidence.203 Clients are often better served when 
attorneys undertake the opportunity to learn what mock jurors have to 
say about their plans for presenting the case.204 
2.   Evaluating Case Themes 
A well-organized case theme gives jurors a foundation from which 
to evaluate information and make decisions.205 While attorneys often 
develop a cursory case narrative without really knowing its value, 
researchers will be familiar with the story model of juror decision 
making.206 Based on a variety of supporting research, the story model 
posits that jurors organize evidence into a comprehensive narrative 
format, which includes confirmatory information and disregards 
disconfirming evidence.207 Knowing how to fit the case theme into a 
story that resonates with jurors will improve the odds of securing a 
favorable verdict.208 
Attorneys can and should use SGR to evaluate how jurors respond 
to intended case narratives and adjust their planned presentations 
based on the feedback they receive.209 By testing case themes before 
trial, attorneys can determine whether they are comprehensible, 
believable, and memorable enough for jurors to rely on and refer to 
during deliberations.210 An added benefit of using trial consultants is 
that they can help to brainstorm alternative organizing frameworks 
and then gather empirical data to test which themes work best.211 
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Another factor to consider is what story the opponent will tell. If 
attorneys are able, via SGR, to anticipate their opponents’ case 
narratives, they can prepare to counter these arguments with a 
convincing and memorable story of their own. 
3.   Assisting in Determining Damages 
With respect to damage awards, litigation consultants can assist 
attorneys with three tasks: (a) determining the value of a plaintiff’s 
injury, (b) engaging and preparing expert witnesses who can testify 
about the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries, and (c) helping 
attorneys create persuasive arguments regarding damages.212 Perhaps 
the most important role of the consultant is in helping litigants 
determine approximately how much their case is worth.213 
Assessing damages is problematic for both lawyers and jurors. 
Although attorneys can provide schedules or examples of typical 
awards to assist jurors in compensating for physical harms and 
economic losses,214 there is little they can do to quantify non-
economic damages such as pain and suffering and emotional distress 
which comprise approximately fifty percent of all compensation 
awarded in civil cases.215 Furthermore, though attorneys often use 
jurors’ demographic features to guide decisions about jury selection, 
such information is not a good predictor of damage awards.216 
Rather, jurors’ preconceptions about injury impact and recovery from 
injury can be useful in predicting how they will quantify plaintiffs’ 
suffering and defendants’ obligations to compensate for those 
harms.217 
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Consultants can assist litigants with all of these issues. They can 
help attorneys discern how much a plaintiff is likely to recover in a 
jury trial and whether it would be advisable to settle.218 They can also 
assess what aspects of a plaintiff’s injury elicit the greatest amount of 
sympathy and skepticism, which can then be highlighted by the 
plaintiff or discounted by the defendant during trial.219 
III.   CONCLUSION 
Given his high profile and the volatile nature of the claims, it is 
likely that Bill Cosby and his team of attorneys engaged the 
assistance of a litigation consultant prior to settling his 2006 lawsuit. 
In light of the nearly two-dozen claims of sexual assault and a related 
defamation lawsuit now pending, it behooves Cosby to have 
consultants close at hand. As we have shown, litigation consultants 
can be exceedingly helpful in pointing out blind spots that bias 
attorneys’ judgments of likely values and victors in lawsuits.220 
Consultants’ insights allow litigants to overcome predictable 
limitations in forecasting and inform their decisions about which 
claims to settle, when to settle, and for how much to settle.221 
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